Composites, compromises, and CHARM: what is the evidence for blend memory representations?

TitleComposites, compromises, and CHARM: what is the evidence for blend memory representations?
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication1991
AuthorsSchooler JW, Tanaka JW
JournalJ Exp Psychol Gen
Volume120
Issue1
Pagination96-100; discussion 101-5
Date Published1991 Mar
ISSN0096-3445
KeywordsAssociation Learning, attention, Discrimination Learning, Humans, Mental Recall, Retention (Psychology), Visual Perception
Abstract

Metcalfe's (1990) distributed memory model simulates many misinformation effects by assuming representations that superimpose information from multiple sources. In the present article, two types of evidence are reviewed for such "blend" representations: composite recollections, including items from both the original and postevent sources (e.g., a previously seen intersection is remembered with a subsequently suggested stop sign), and compromise recollections, including features that cannot be exclusively associated with either source (e.g., a green car that was later suggested to be blue is remembered as bluish green). The considerable evidence for composite recollections provides little support for blend representations. Compromise recollections, though seemingly more persuasive, are both rare and interpretable without postulating blend representations. Speculation is made about potential findings that would support blend representations.

Alternate JournalJ Exp Psychol Gen
PubMed ID1827146