You Don’t Know How It Feels: Accuracy in Emotion Perception Predicts Responsiveness of Support

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When bad things happen people often seek out close others for support to help regulate their negative emotions. The degree to which support providers are responsive to the specific needs of support seekers is associated with many outcomes, including how effective that support is in regulating emotion. The ability of support providers to accurately assess the emotions experienced by support seekers seems crucial, yet few studies have examined the role this type of accuracy plays in support provision. We predicted that individuals who accurately assessed the emotions being experienced by a support seeker would provide more responsive support. Further, we predicted that individual differences in emotion differentiation (perceiving differences between similar emotions), range (experiencing a range of emotions), and clarity (understanding the cause and effect of one’s emotions) would facilitate emotional accuracy and, in turn, responsiveness. Participants read scenarios depicting their romantic partners seeking support to help regulate different negative emotions; they then wrote supportive messages and indicated which emotions they thought their partners would be experiencing. Individual differences in emotional range and clarity (but not differentiation) predicted how accurate participants were in gauging the emotions depicted in the scenarios. In turn, accuracy predicted how responsive their messages were, as rated by independent coders. These results suggest that accuracy in perceiving a partner’s emotions is crucial for providing responsive support and individual differences in one’s own emotional experiences are associated both accuracy and responsiveness. Our findings have implications for research on interpersonal emotion regulation, close relationships, and social support.

Keywords: social support, emotion regulation, responsiveness, emotion perception accuracy

Responsiveness in close relationships is the degree to which one partner “attends to and supports another’s needs and goals” (Reis & Gable, 2015, p. 67), and is conveyed in interactions between people. More specifically, when Person A self-discloses personally relevant information with Person B, responsiveness is the degree to which Person B’s reaction is perceived as understanding of Person A’s core self, validating of Person A’s views of the situation, and caring about Person A’s well-being (e.g., Reis, Clark, & Holmes, 2004; Reis & Gable, 2015; Reis & Shaver, 1988). Perceptions of responsiveness have been found to be a major driver of satisfaction, intimacy, and trust in relationships (e.g., Canevello & Crocker, 2010; Maisel & Gable, 2009; Otto, Laurenceau, Siegel, & Belcher, 2015). Moreover, responsiveness is an important feature in a variety of interactions, such as conflict, discussions between spouses, patient-physician health interactions, and getting-acquainted talks between strangers (see Reis & Gable, 2015 for a review).

Most relevant to the current study, responsiveness is a critical determinant of the quality of interactions following a particular type of self-disclosure, when one person talks about a stressor or negative event, known as a social support interaction (e.g., Maisel & Gable, 2009). Studies on social support have repeatedly shown that the degree to which the person who disclosed the event perceives the other person to be responsive predicts a host of outcomes such as well-being for the individual disclosing the event, including the downregulation of negative emotions (e.g., Kane, McCall, Collins, & Blascovich, 2012; Maisel & Gable, 2009; Weeks & Pasupathi, 2011). However, providing responsive support can be quite difficult and attempts at support are often seen by the recipients as unhelpful, overbearing, or simply off the mark (e.g., Rafaeli & Gleason, 2009).

Support that is perceived as unresponsive not only fails to help downregulate negative emotions but can actually increase feelings of stress, sadness, and frustration (e.g., Maisel & Gable, 2009). Moreover, relationships in which partners are chronically seen as unresponsive to one another’s support needs are less intimate and satisfying (e.g., Reis et al., 2004; Lemay, Clark, & Feeney, 2007; Reis & Gable, 2015). Given the pivotal role that responsiveness plays in relationship quality and the precariousness of conveying responsiveness during social support transactions, in particular, it is critical to understand factors that might contribute to a social
support attempt being more or less responsive to the support seeker.

Perceptions of responsiveness during interactions, such as social support transactions, are partially determined by characteristics of the perceivers, such as their expectations for the interaction and individual differences in attachment orientations (e.g., Lemay & Clark, 2008; Shallcross, Howland, Bemis, Simpson, & Frazier, 2011). However, a growing body of evidence shows that perceptions of responsiveness are also critically grounded in the actual behavior of responders. For example, several studies have documented that independent coder ratings of responders’ behaviors during interactions in the lab correspond to perceivers’ reports of their perceptions of responsiveness (e.g., Feeney & Thrush, 2010; Maisel, Gable, & Strachman, 2008). There is also correspondence between disclosers’ perceptions of responsiveness and responders’ reports of their own behaviors and intentions to be responsive in daily diary studies (e.g., Debrot, Cook, Perez, & Horn, 2012; Gable, Gosnell, Maisel, & Strachman, 2012). In short, responsiveness does not lie solely in the eye of the perceiver, as responders behave in ways that convey more or less responsiveness. Investigating the characteristics, skills, motivations, or circumstances that differentiate social support providers who are more or less responsive can provide insight into relationship processes as well as interpersonal emotion regulation processes.

**Accuracy and Responsiveness**

Although accurately assessing the thoughts and feelings being experienced by the discloser presumably underlies conveying understanding, one of the three critical components of responsiveness, there is evidence in the literature that both possessing a biased (more positive and benign) interpretation of the situation and being accurate positively predict relationship outcomes (e.g., Fletcher & Kerr, 2010; Lackenbauer, Campbell, Rubin, Fletcher, & Trooster, 2010). However, examination of this literature suggests that accuracy on a specific level (compared with global evaluations) facilitates relationship outcomes (e.g., Neff & Karney, 2005). For example, partners’ accurate perceptions of one another’s daily behaviors (e.g., Gable, Reis, & Downey, 2003), specific abilities (Neff & Karney, 2005), and attitudes (e.g., Sanbonmatsu, Uchino, & Birmingham, 2011) are associated with positive relationship outcomes. More directly applicable to our study is the recent finding that when people are motivated to be responsive, empathic accuracy (i.e., accurately perceiving what an interaction partner is thinking and feeling during an interaction; Ickes, 1993) facilitates perceived responsiveness (Wincewski, Bowen, & Collins, 2016). In fact, very recent work suggests that asking more questions to gain accuracy, especially follow-up questions, leads to being perceived as more responsive by support seekers (Huang, Yemans, Brooks, Minson, & Gino, 2017).

Accurately perceiving emotions in others has been described as the most basic of the four skills that comprise emotional intelligence (Salovey & Grewal, 2005). Studies have shown that people who score higher on emotional intelligence tests, and specifically those who are more accurate at perceiving emotions, report having more socially supportive relationships with their friends and family members (e.g., Ciarrochi, Chan, & Bajgar, 2001). In the context of social support interactions, we reasoned that correctly identifying the type of negative emotions experienced by a support seeker would be critical for the support provider to convey responsiveness. This reasoning is also consistent with related past work, such as Verhofstadt, Buysse, Ickes, Davis, and Devoldre’s (2008) findings that providers who experienced the same emotions as the seeker during a support interaction were able to provide more skilled social support. Thus, we reasoned that the degree to which a person can perceive the emotion(s) that another person is experiencing in a given situation would predict that person’s ability to convey responsive support. One factor that predicts the accurate recognition of another’s emotions is how one perceives their own emotions (e.g., Joseph & Newman, 2010). That is, individual differences in how one typically experiences his or her own emotions is a strong predictor of how accurately he or she can understand the emotions experienced by another person. Several studies have found links between self-reported experiences with, and recognition of, emotions and the ability to perceive emotions cues in from others and the environment (e.g., Ickes, 1993; Kang & Shaver, 2004). In the current research we focused on individual differences in (a) the ability to differentiate discrete emotions (differentiation), (b) the range of different emotions one experiences (range), and (c) understanding of the source of one’s emotions (clarity).

**Individual Differences in Emotional Experience**

Individuals vary in the complexity of their emotional experience. Emotional complexity is thought to consist of two distinct but connected components: differentiation and range (Kang & Shaver, 2004; Sommers, 1981). Emotion differentiation, also known as granularity, is the ability to represent emotions as specific, discrete states (Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001). Although researchers are interested in their independent effects, range and differentiation are often paired because the number of distinctions one draws between emotions inherently influences the number of emotions one experiences. We also examined emotional clarity, which is the degree to which people understand the causes and pathways of their own emotions (Salovey et al., 1995). In the following sections we outline relevant findings on which we based our predictions for individual differences in emotion differentiation, range, and clarity.

**Differentiation**

People low in emotion differentiation tend to experience global feelings of “bad” or “good,” whereas people high in emotion differentiation understand and express specific emotions differently. For example, someone high in emotion differentiation might discriminate between anger and annoyance when expressing him or herself, but someone low in differentiation would simply describe the feeling as bad. Emotion differentiation has been linked to a variety of outcomes, most relevant to the current study are differentiation’s links to emotion regulation and close relationship quality (e.g., Barrett et al., 2001; Kang, Shaver, Sue, Min, & Jing, 2003).

People higher in emotion differentiation benefit from better self-regulation of emotions, as they have more emotion-specific

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1 Studies finding links between emotion perception skills or emotional intelligence and social support quality however have not distinguished between support provision and perceptions of support quality from others.
information being activated during the representation of an emotional experience, such as how it will express itself, what bodily reactions to expect, and what action sequences could regulate or ameliorate these reactions (Barrett et al., 2001; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). A differentiated representation of emotions is important for recognizing the appropriate regulatory responses to different emotional experiences (Barrett et al., 2001; Kimhy et al., 2014; Saarni, 1997). Better insight into one’s feelings makes one more able to use emotions as a source of information, allowing for more adaptive coping, regulation, and interaction with the outside world (Joseph & Newman, 2010; Rees, Rothman, Lehavy, & Sanchez-Burks, 2013).

Also pointing us to the prediction that differentiation may be important for responsive behavior in relationships is prior findings that differentiation is related to relationship quality. For example, Kang and colleagues (2003) found that differentiation predicted relationship quality across both the collectivistic and individualistic samples in their study. Consequently, we reasoned that one possible pathway linking differentiation to relationship quality lies in the ability to accurately perceive and then appropriately respond to another’s emotions during social support interactions. Specifically, we predicted that people high in differentiation who are engaged in interpersonal emotion regulation should not only be better able to understand an emotional experience, but also better able to express their understanding, caring, and validation in a way that is experienced as understanding by those around them.

Range

Emotional range is another component of emotional complexity which has been associated with emotion regulation processes and interpersonal outcomes. Greater range of both positive and negative emotions is associated with enhanced resilience, as experiencing more emotions increases knowledge of emotion regulation resources, in turn, enhancing coping abilities (Armstrong, Galligan, & Critchley, 2011; Philippe, Lecours, & Beaulieu-Pelletier, 2009). In addition, Harber and colleagues (2008) found that greater range was linked to support provision and facilitating coping in others. Similar to differentiation, experiencing a broad range of emotion increases the amount of emotion-relevant information available during emotion regulation exchanges (Rees et al., 2013). This wealth of emotion knowledge can enhance one’s ability to understand and validate emotional experiences and facilitate the identification of effective coping strategies (Joseph & Newman, 2010). Sommers (1981) also found that people with greater emotional range were better at perspective-taking activities, making it easier to apply emotional knowledge to the situation of another person.

Clarity

Emotional clarity, the third distinct emotion-perception ability under investigation is a metathinking of the path of one’s emotions, including the causes of one’s emotions and the biological and mental effects of one’s emotions (Boden, Bonn-Miller, Kashdan, Alvarez, & Gross, 2012; Coffey, Berenbaum, & Kerns, 2003). One can be highly specific in naming emotions without having a deeper understanding of their source, and one can have this understanding of emotions without representing them discretely. While clarity and differentiation do not predict one another (Boden, Thompson, Dizén, Berenbaum, & Baker, 2013), clarity is also related to emotion regulation. Low levels of clarity are related to poorer overall emotion regulation (Gratz & Roemer, 2008; Salovey et al., 1995), because understanding the source and consequences of one’s emotions aids development of effective coping and regulation strategies (Boden et al., 2012).

As with differentiation and range, clarity contributes to emotion knowledge and should make people higher in clarity better able to identify someone else’s emotions and choose effective emotion regulation strategies. Indeed, Ramos, Fernandez-Berrocal, and Extermera (2007) found that individuals low in emotional clarity are less able to understand the reasons for others’ negative emotions and engage in less perspective taking. Similarly, Gilbert and colleagues (2012) found that those who had difficulty understanding their own emotions were more reluctant to get involved in another’s emotions and also reported lower marital satisfaction than those who had less difficulty understanding their emotions.

There is evidence to suggest that clarity facilitates more efficient and situationally appropriate behavior during the emotion regulation process. Individuals lower in emotional clarity must use more resources to implement regulation strategies, leaving fewer resources for goal-directed thought processes (Gohn & Clore, 2000, 2002; Hamilton, Clark, Leskovec, & Jurafsky, 2016) and appropriate behavioral responses (Flynn & Rudolph, 2010, 2014). Specifically, adolescents low in emotional clarity were found to engage in more involuntary distancing behavior and less likely to use problem-solving or emotional expression during interactions fraught with emotion (Flynn & Rudolph, 2010).

The Current Research

The hypotheses were based on two streams of research, one stemming from the close relationship literature on responsiveness and social support and the other on individual differences in emotion experience and accuracy from the emotion regulation literature. In this work we asked not only what individual differences account for people being more or less responsive during social support transactions (differentiation, range, and clarity), but also tested a potential process that could account for these links (accuracy in perceiving the support seeker’s emotions). Specifically, in the current research we measured individual differences in participants’ clarity, range, and differentiation. We then presented them with four vignettes in which their romantic partner conveyed distinct negative events. Following each vignette, we asked them how they would likely respond to their romantic partner and rated which emotions their partner would likely be feeling in the situation. We made the following predictions, which are also summarized in Figure 1.

**Hypothesis 1:** Individual differences in clarity, range, and differentiation will be positively associated with responsiveness (understanding, validation, and caring) of replies to partners in the four vignettes.

**Hypothesis 2:** Individual differences in clarity, range, and differentiation will be positively associated with accuracy in
perceiving the predominant emotion conveyed in each vignette.

**Hypothesis 3:** Accuracy in perceiving predominant emotions in the vignettes will be positively associated with the responsiveness of imagined replies.

**Hypothesis 4:** Accuracy in perceiving predominant emotions in the vignettes will mediate associations between individual differences in emotional experience and responsiveness of imagined replies.

**Method**

**Participants**

One hundred seventy-eight people currently involved in a romantic relationship were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) online workers pool. Eleven were excluded, leaving a final data set of 167 participants; two participants were excluded for failing to complete several measures, three were excluded for providing repetitive data and unrealistically fast response times, and six were excluded for failing to follow directions for the experimental task. We chose our sample size based on a power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009; for a linear regression analysis with a .20 effect size and .80 power) and a realistic accounting of our resources. Our goal was to have a sample of 160; but we anticipated a 10% attrition rate so set our collection target on MTurk at 175. Participants ranged from Age 19 to 60, with a mean of 32.04 (our collection target on mTurk at 175). Participants ranged from Age 19 to 60, with a mean of 32.04 (SD = 8.4); 53% of the sample (88 people) were male and 47% were female; 77.2% of participants were Caucasian, 7.8% were Black/African American, 7.2% were Asian/Pacific Islander, 6.6 were Hispanic/Latina/o, and the remaining two participants described themselves as other. All participants reported current involvement in romantic relationships; 82.6% had been in the relationship for more than 1 year. All materials and procedures were approved by the Human Subjects Committee at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Participants received $2.50 in compensation following completion of the study.

**Individual Difference Measures**

**Range and differentiation of emotional experiences.** Differentiation was measured with Kang and Shaver’s (2004) Range and Differentiation of Emotional Experiences Scale (RDEES). The RDEES is a 14-item self-report measure with questions tapping both emotion differentiation and emotional range in responders. The Differentiation subscale is made up of seven items asking participants to rank how accurately statements such as “I am aware of the different nuances and subtleties of a given emotion,” “I tend to draw fine distinctions between similar feelings,” and “If emotions are viewed as colors, I can notice even small variations between one type of color” describe them, from 1 (Does not describe me at all) to 5 (Describes me very well). The Range subscale contains items such as “I experience a wide range of emotions,” and “I don’t experience many different emotions in everyday life” (reverse scored). Both subscales also demonstrated good internal validity; the Range subscale had a Cronbach’s alpha .86 and the Differentiation subscale had Cronbach’s alpha .89. Previous work has found that scores on the RDEES are correlated with other methods of measuring range and differentiation, such as experience sampling and card sorting measures (Kang & Shaver, 2004). In the current sample, differentiation and range were positively correlated, r(167) = .665, p < .001, which is consistent with previous research.

**Clarity of feelings.** Salovey and colleagues’ (1995) Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS) was developed as a self-reported measure of three facets of emotional intelligence: clarity of feelings, attention to feelings, and mood repair. In the current study we administered only the 15-item Clarity subscale as the other two subscales were not directly relevant to our hypotheses. The Clarity subscale of the TMMS is a widely used measure of emotional clarity with items anchored to a 5-point scale, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Items are statements such as “I almost always know exactly how I am feeling,” “I can’t make sense of my feelings” reverse scored “I am usually confused about how I feel” reverse scored. The scale demonstrated good reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of .89. Clarity was correlated with range (r(167) = .350) and differentiation (r(167) = .468; p < .001).

**Vignettes**

In four different vignettes an actor—the participant’s romantic partner in the present study—conveyed their experience of distinct negative events. The four vignettes represented appraisals of situations that have been shown to produce a particular type of negative emotion in the people experiencing those events (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). Specifically, we wrote vignettes describing events that would be likely to induce either sadness, frustration, worry, or shame in the actor experiencing that situa-
tion. Importantly the vignettes never mention the target emotion, or any specific emotion the actor is experiencing. Instead, to hone in on a particular emotion we relied on Ellsworth and Smith’s (1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) appraisal models of emotion to construct the actor’s cognitive evaluations of each situation. Research on appraisal models has shown that certain patterns of appraisals are reliably associated with the experience of certain emotions (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). Thus in this study, for each vignette, the actor described his or her cognitive appraisals of the situation, and those appraisals were designed to correspond to appraisals associated with the target emotion. For example, the vignette designed to convey a frustrating experience described goal blockage and included an appraisal of responsibility of other persons, whereas our vignette designed to convey an experience of guilt/shame described a transgression and included an appraisal of responsibility of the self. Our measure of accuracy indexed the degree to which participants inferred that the actor was feeling more of the target emotion conveyed by the appraisals in each vignette (and feeling less of the emotions that were not depicted in each vignette). The exact vignettes participants read are below (vignette titles and emotions were not presented to participants):

**Goal blockage (frustration):**

The personnel office at work keeps misplacing my application forms for health insurance! I have to fill this all out again and turn it in tomorrow. They were really sorry and I know I’ll definitely get covered, but the forms won’t be processed until after the holidays because of their mistakes. I can’t believe they were so incompetent and there is nothing I can do about it.

**Personal transgression (guilt/shame):**

My mom and I were talking and she said something about wanting to do a family photo shoot. I was in a bad mood and completely lost my temper on her; I just think those cheesy family pictures are so stupid. But this is so important to her and she does so much for me; I can’t believe I spoke to her like that.

**Anticipation of negative outcome (worry):**

My friend is taking the qualifying exam for a job with my company next Monday. I did really well on it my first try, but she struggles with these kinds of tests. She has always wanted a job like mine and I know she wants to at least get near my score; she’ll be so disappointed if she doesn’t pass. I hope it works out.

**Loss (sadness):**

The wristwatch I inherited from my great-grandfather stopped working this morning, and the repairman said there’s no way to fix it. It was so old I hardly used it, and I know it’s just an object, but it’s been in my family for ages. I wish there was a way to get it working again.

### Dependent Measures

**Responsive Behaviors Coding Guide (Maisel et al., 2008)** which was originally developed to analyze responsiveness in videotaped interactions. In our modified coding scheme, to assess understanding, coders looked for paraphrasing or reference to the facts of the event described, description of relevant consequences or future plans, and reference to how the target might be feeling. Validation was assessed by assurance of the partner’s competence, empathic reaction words (e.g., “wow!” or “oh no!”), confirmation of an emotional reaction, and offers of perspectives on the event. Caring was assessed by use of affectionate words or nicknames, offers of support or help, attempts to lift or improve mood, or expression of a joint outcome (e.g., “we can call her together tomorrow to apologize!”).

A total of four coders who were blind to the hypotheses were trained to use the coding scheme on a subset of 10 responses. Two of the coders rated each response with three separate scores for understanding, caring, and validation. Scores were from 1 (least responsive) to 7 (most responsive). Interrater reliability was excellent: interclass correlations (ICCs) across the four vignettes ranged from .79 to .85, for caring; understanding ICC values ranged from .74 to .92; and validation ICC values ranged from .80 to .98. The scores for understanding, validation, and caring across the vignettes were positively correlated with one another (r(167)s ranged from .340 to .450 for understanding, .358 to .460 for validation, and .359 to .488 for caring; all ps < .001). In addition, we did not expect that our predictors would be related to responsiveness differently across the four vignettes. Thus, we created an average understanding score across the four vignettes (α = .73), an average validation score across the four vignettes (α = .73), and an average caring score across the four vignettes (α = .76). Consistent with prior work, understanding, validation, and caring were strongly correlated (r(167)s ranged from .814 to .874, all ps < .001); therefore, we also created an average measure of responsiveness across the four vignettes (M = 3.86, SD = 1.02; M_range = 1.42 to 6.29; α = .80).

**Perceived emotion.** After completing the open-ended task, participants rated a set of 13 emotions using the scale 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely) according to how much they thought their partner would be experiencing that emotion in this situation. The list of emotions contained eight items assessing the target emotions represented in the vignettes (two items for the target emotion in each of the four vignettes) and five filler items that were not predicted to be relevant to any of the vignettes. Specifically, the eight target emotions were frustration, anger, sadness, depression, shame, guilt, worry, and fear. The five filler items were hurt, disgust, contentment, jealousy, and boredom. We averaged the two emotions that represented each of the four target emotions so that participants had a score for frustration (frustration, anger), sadness (sadness, depression), shame (shame, guilt), and worry (worry, fear) items for each vignette.

### Procedure

After giving informed consent, participants filled out the demographics questionnaire and then completed the individual difference measures (differentiation, range, and clarity). Participants were then presented with the vignettes in a randomized order and following each vignette they provided an open-ended response. Upon submitting the open-ended response, they were presented the
emotion items. Finally, participants completed a brief attention check and were debriefed.

**Results**

**Preliminary Analyses**

We first examined whether, on average, participants were able to accurately infer the emotion that each vignette was intended to convey on the part of the actor. As can be seen in Table 1, on average participants rated the target emotion significantly higher than any of the other three emotions in each of the scenarios; contrasts comparing the corresponding target emotion to each of the three other emotions in each vignette ranged from a low of $F(1, 166) = 103.27, p < .001, 95\% CI [.83, 1.41], \eta^2_p = .38$ to a high of $F(1, 166) = 738.50, p < .001, 95\% CI [3.40, 4.14], \eta^2_p = .82$.

In addition, each target emotion received was given its highest rating following its corresponding vignette; contrasts comparing ratings of each emotion across the four vignettes ranged from a low of $F(1, 166) = 37.00, p < .001, 95\% CI [.36, .94], \eta^2_p = .18$ to a high of $F(1, 166) = 706.93, p < .001, 95\% CI [3.52, 4.31], \eta^2_p = .81$. Finally, the target emotion in each vignette was rated significantly higher than any of the five filler emotion items; contrasts comparing the target emotion to each of the five filler emotions in each vignette ranged from a low of $F(1, 166) = 29.06, p < .001, 95\% CI [.30, 1.04], \eta^2_p = .15$ to a high of $F(1, 166) = 831.51, p < .001, 95\% CI [3.43, 4.23], \eta^2_p = .83$.²

Although, on average, participants were able to pick up on the primary target emotion in each vignette, there was also considerable variance between people in terms of how high they rated the primary target emotion compared with the other three emotions; see Table 1 for means and standard deviations. In this sense, some participants were more “accurate” at zeroing in on the target emotion than others. Thus, we constructed a measure of emotion accuracy, by subtracting the mean rating of the three “incorrect” emotions from the rating of the primary target emotion in each vignette. For example, for the loss vignette we subtracted the average of the frustration, shame, and worry ratings from the sad rating. The mean and variance for the accuracy scores in each vignette are in the far right column of Table 1. The accuracy scores in each vignette were strongly correlated with one another; $r(167)$ ranged from .30 to .63, all $p$s < .001; people who were more accurate in identifying the target emotion in one scenario were likely to be more accurate in identifying the target emotion in the other scenarios. In addition, as we had no reason to think that our hypotheses would differ across the four scenarios, we created a composite measure of accuracy by calculating the average of the accuracy scores across the four vignettes ($M = 2.23, SD = 1.09$; $M_{\text{range}} = -.67$ to 4.29; $\alpha = .77$).

**Individual Differences in Emotional Experience and Responsiveness**

We tested $H_1$ to determine whether individual differences in clarity, differentiation, and range were associated with responsiveness as coded from participants’ open-ended replies to the vignettes. Results are on the left half of Table 2. There was a significant positive association between participants’ range scores and responsiveness ($r(167) = .220, p = .004$), however participants’ differentiation scores and responsiveness were not significantly associated ($r(167) = .026, p = .741$). Although most researchers treat individual differences in emotional experiences as independent predictors, because range and clarity were correlated with one another we also ran a separate regression model in which we simultaneously included both range and clarity as predictors of responsiveness. Range remained a significant predictor ($b = .198, p = .016$) of responsiveness but clarity was no longer a significant predictor of responsiveness ($b = .064, p = .431$).

Overall the results partially supported $H_1$; individual differences in one’s own emotional experiences predicted responsiveness, but only for the measures of clarity and range. The higher participants rated themselves on their own emotional clarity and range of emotional experiences, the more responsive their replies to the vignettes were rated by our coders.

**Accuracy as a Mediator Between Individual Differences and Responsiveness**

Prior to testing the direct and indirect effects of the individual difference measures on responsiveness we first tested whether accuracy in emotion perception (the proposed mediator) was associated with responsiveness as coded from participants’ open-ended replies to the vignettes ($H_3$). Accuracy was significantly associated with responsiveness ($r(167) = .300, p < .001$).

We tested $H_4$ using the PROCESS macro in SPSS (Hayes, 2017) by examining the direct and indirect effects of individual differences on accuracy. The results partially supported $H_4$; individual differences in one’s own emotional experiences predicted accuracy in perceiving another’s emotion, but only for the measures of clarity and range. The higher participants rated themselves on their own emotional clarity and range of emotional experiences, the more accurate they were at perceiving the primary emotion being experienced by the actor in the vignette.

² Disappointment, a sixth filler emotion item was inadvertently included in the goal blocking vignette. As with the other filler items, the target emotion of frustration was rated significantly higher than disappointment $F(1, 166) = 52.58, p < .001, 95\% CI [.60, 1.50], \eta^2_p = .24$. 
Correlations Between Emotional Experience Traits, Accuracy, and Responsiveness

Table 2

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Responsiveness</th>
<th>Accuracy</th>
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<td>.086</td>
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<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>.220</td>
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<td>.026</td>
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Note. Means and (standard deviations). Target emotion for each vignette is in bold. Accuracy scores created by subtracting the mean of the three nontarget emotions from the target emotion for each vignette.

Discussion

Although not often framed as such, social support is an interpersonal emotion regulation process. That is, providing support when a close relationship partner experiences a negative event most often involves attempts at downregulating the other’s negative emotion. In addition, depending on the specifics of the situation, responding to another’s needs entails the regulation of one’s own emotion (e.g., Gosnell & Gable, 2017). Unfortunately, providing effective social support is difficult and attempts at support can often come across as unhelpful, off the mark, or overbearing (e.g., Rafaeli & Gleason, 2009). However, support that is perceived as responsive to one’s sense of self is not only effective at emotion regulation but also contributes to relationship well-being; while support that is perceived is unresponsive to the self can actually increase negative emotions in the support seeker and is associated with poorer relationship quality (e.g., Maisel & Gable, 2009). Therefore, it is critical to understand factors that predict which responders are more or less likely to be responsive during social support transactions and what processes might account for these differences. As far as we know our study was the first to look at how individual differences in emotional experience predict performance on a social support task set in the context of an existing close relationship.

Specifically, in the present work we asked whether the manner in which we experience our own emotional events is related to how we respond to close others’ emotion regulation needs. Our findings provided partial support for our hypotheses. We found that individual differences in emotional range and emotional clarity were associated with responsiveness. Although several studies have found that individual differences in range and clarity are associated with the quality of close relationships (e.g., Kang et al., 2003; Lischetzke & Eid, 2017), ours is the first to link these differences to a particular, and relationally critical, process—responsiveness. We found that at least in the context of our social support vignettes, people who reported experiencing a greater range of emotional experiences and more clarity in what emotions they are experiencing at a given time provided more responsive support to their partners. These findings have implications for the close relationships and the emotion literatures because they clearly link intrapersonal emotional experience to interpersonal processes. Specifically, relationship researchers have become increasingly interested in the role of emotions and emotion regulation in close relationships (e.g., Algoe, Gable, & Maisel, 2010; Campos, Schoebi, Gonzaga, Gable, & Keltner, 2015), and evidence such as that presented here further supports these efforts. In terms of literature on emotion, these findings are particularly relevant to research on emotion regulation, as they point to pathways linking intrapersonal and interpersonal emotion regulation (e.g., Zaki & Williams, 2013).
Our study also showed that the associations between individual differences in emotional experiences and responsiveness was largely mediated through accuracy in perceiving the emotion that was likely being experienced by the support seeker. Consistent with prior work, emotional clarity and range were positively associated with accurately ascribing emotions to support seekers in the vignettes. The greater range of emotional states an individual personally experiences and the better they are at understanding the course of their own emotions predicted how accurate they were at inferring the emotion their partners were experiencing in our hypothetical scenarios and how responsive their open-ended replies were to their partners. This study highlights some of the pathways through which an individual’s intrapersonal emotion experiences can have an influence on these interpersonal processes. Our findings offer potential insights into previous work linking emotion regulation to close relationship quality (e.g., Barrett et al., 2001; Kimhy et al., 2011 and one’s ability to cope with emotional experiences, both intrapersonally and interpersonally (e.g., Barrett et al., 2001; Kimhy et al., 2011). This would be incongruent with prior work that has found associations between individual differences in emotion differentiation and one’s ability to cope with emotional experiences, both intrapersonally and interpersonally (e.g., Barrett et al., 2001; Kimhy et al., 2011). Another possible explanation is that our task did not tap into differentiation very well in that our four different emotion situations were already very distinct. The feelings of frustration, shame, worry, and sadness are pretty distinct from one another. Perhaps if our scenarios required distinguishing between emotions that were more similar to one another, we would have tapped into individual differences in differentiation. That is, if we would have included scenarios requiring participants to distinguish between shame and guilt or between love and desire it may have been more difficult for those low on differentiation.

There are, of course, other limitations to our study. Participants had to imagine their partners had experienced the events described in the scenarios and thus were neither involved in a live interaction nor were they responding in real time to the partner. In addition, some people’s partners may have idiosyncratic emotional reactions to different types of situations. Although we designed the vignettes using well-validated appraisal models of emotion as our guide, it could be that some participants’ partners typically respond to their goals being blocked with anxiety and not frustration, for example. Our accuracy scores would not have picked up on this real dyadic accuracy.

Despite these limitations, the current research highlights a possible mechanism linking intrapersonal emotional experiences to interpersonal emotional experiences. Specifically, experiencing a wider range of emotions and having a better meta-awareness of the course of one’s own emotions seems to give one an advantage in recognizing the likely emotional experiences of close others. Moreover, this accuracy in recognizing others’ emotions leads to conveying a greater understanding (and validation and caring) of partners in need and greater responsiveness in the interaction. Given the importance of responsiveness for relationships, the current work contributes to our understanding of how emotion regulation and its related processes are linked to relationship quality.

References


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